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CAPT Jeff Kline, USN (Ret), U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, Mon-
terey, California, USA (left) &
CAPT Bo Wallander, RSwN (Ret), Saab EDS and fellow of the Royal 
Swedish Society of Naval Sciences (right).
Lions in the Littoral
Leadership on Risk’s Edge
As U.S. Navy forces focus on littoral operations, there is a need to explore force 
structure and capabilities that address operations in the global littorals with and 
without support of traditional blue water force structure from the U.S. Navy’s key 
naval partners. This Navy force, optimized for littoral operations will act indepen-
dently within the complex littoral zone and against sophisticated threats and it will 
act as a force multiplier in the application of traditional blue water capabilities 
adjacent to the littorals. 
To address the littoral battle space—broadly defined as the region where land and 
ocean meet—in all regards, a Littoral Operations Center (LOC) was established 
at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) in California in November 15, 2012. 
The center is organized under the Department for Defense Analyses.
The Swedish Armed Forces serve a national defense concept largely based on Lit-
toral Operations. The long coast-line and the Baltic Sea have through history been 
a natural defense line against attacking enemies. The U.S. Navy has invited the 
Swedish Navy and Saab AB as the first foreign contributors to the different LOC 
activities comprising, lecturing, studies, workshops, war gaming and R&D pro-
jects. Saab AB and NPS has signed a CRADA (Cooperative Research and Deve-
lopment Agreement) to enable upcoming activities.
In the following essay, Capt. Jeff Kline, USN (Ret) and Capt. Bo Wallander, RSwN 
(Ret), describe leadership on risk’s edge and is called “Lions in the Littorals.” The 
essay takes an historical view over how bold leadership has been conducted over 
the course of time and gives some interesting conclusions to reflect on, also in 
modern warfare.
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Lions in the Littorals
 “All commanders are expected to accept prudent risk and allow the same of their 
subordinates.  …  Action with risk is often better than inaction with no risk.”  Admi-
ral M. G. Mullen, Navy Strategic Plan, May 20061
“Given the same amount of intelligence, timidity will do a thousand times more da-
mage in war than audacity” Carl Von Clausewitz, On War2
“Audaces fortuna iuvat” (Fortune favors the bold).  Virgil, The Aeneid
What is audacity?1 A dictionary uses flat-
tering words such as intrepid (characte-
rized by fearlessness, fortitude, and en-
durance), daring, originality and verve 
(specialized ability or talent); along side 
these, less complementary such as “reck-
lessly bold.”2  Many times which meaning 
a user implies depends on the final out-
come of an audacious event—successful 
bold actions are daring and original; un-
successful bold actions tend to be reck-
less.  
There is an axiom that risk is com-
mensurate with reward.  In the examples 
provided here of action in the chaotic, 
confused and confined littoral maritime 
environment, success favors the audaci-
ous—audacity favoring lethal, offensive 
action.
On May 5, 1801, Lieutenant Thomas 
Cochrane’s HMS Speedy, a 158-ton brig 
of 14 4-pound guns, was pursuing a Spa-
nish gunboat near Barcelona as part of 
a successful littoral campaign against 
Napoleon’s ally.3 From behind a fishing 
boat cluster appeared the Spanish fri-
gate Gamo, a much larger and faster ship 
1. Navy Strategic Plan in Support of Program 
Objective Memorandum 08, May 2008 p 21
2. On War, Carl Von Clausewitz, Edited and 
Translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, 
Princeton, New Jersey, 1974, p 191
3. Lord Thomas Cochrane is the real life of-
ficer behind Patrick O’Brien’s popular Jack Au-
brey series of Napoleonic novels. 
with 32 guns (22 were 12-pounders) and 
a crew nearly six times that of Speedy. As 
Robert Harvey relates in his book Co-
chrane, The Life and Exploits of a Figh-
ting Captain, young Lieutenant Cochrane 
had three choices: run and probably be 
caught, surrender to the more powerful 
ship, or close and fight.4 Cochrane chose 
to close and fight.
Hoisting false American colors and 
closing Gamo, Cochrane caused his opp-
onent to hesitate, thereby giving himself 
time to reposition before revealing his 
true British flag. Using Speedy’s superior 
maneuverability and timing the Gamo’s 
rolls, Cochrane first placed his smaller 
ship on Gamo’s leeward side, causing 
the downward pointing Spanish guns to 
fire short. Next, as Gamo rolled up and 
gun crews reloaded, Cochrane closed to 
place Speedy under Gamo’s guns causing 
her next broadside to fire overhead. Co-
chrane responded with a grape shot from 
his elevated 4-pounders killing Gamo’s 
Captain de Torres. Over the next hour 
Cochrane maneuvered his ship to keep 
enough distance to prevent Spanish Ma-
rines from boarding but close enough to 
prevent Gamo’s great guns from delive-
ring a broadside. While maintaining this 
close “safe zone,” he kept firing his own 
4. Cochrane, The Life and Exploits of a Figh-
ting Captain, Robert Harvey, Carroll & Graff 
New York, 2000
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guns upward on the enemy’s main deck. 
Finally, Cochrane ordered his crew into 
two boarding parties, one to cross on the 
bow and the other on Gamo’s amidships. 
Save the ship’s doctor to handle Speedy’s 
helm, Cochrane committed his entire 
crew in the boarding effort. In the mêlée 
that followed, a combination of having 
one of his crew strike the Spanish co-
lors, loudly calling for “more men” from 
Speedy, and having already killed the 
Captain, Cochrane created such a chaotic 
and dispiriting situation for the Spanish 
that they surrendered, over 300 men to 50 
British Tars.
How did Cochrane succeed in this im-
possible situation? Was it luck? Robert 
Harvey’s view is more comprehensive. 
He asserts Cochrane rapidly assessed his 
risk of almost certainly losing a chase if 
he ran away compared to matching his 
ship, crew, and own capabilities in a close 
fight.  Flawless execution of an emerging 
plan modified with changing circumstan-
ces was a key factor. 
For Cochrane to make this judgment 
and execute his tactical plan required him 
to know both his ship and his crew, fully 
appreciating the supreme trust they had 
in him and themselves. Of course, a bit of 
deception helped too. Thomas Cochrane 
was 25 years old. 
In 1942 Lieutenant John D. Bulkeley 
was just 30 years old when he comman-
ded Motor Torpedo Boat Squadron 3 in 
a desperate contest for Philippine lit-
toral waters against the invading Japa-
nese. Best known for effecting General 
MacArthur’s escape from Corregidor, 
Bulkeley’s months-long fight with the Ja-
panese Navy was no less daring.   
In his biography Sea Wolf, author Wil-
liam Breuer relates a particular night 
battle that reflects Bulkeley’s daring, cha-
risma, and leadership.5 Pre-dawn January 
23, a tired PT34 crew was returning to 
base with a wounded man after a battle in 
Subic Bay had resulted in the sinking of a 
motorized Japanese barge. John Bulkeley 
was embarked. Coming across another 
heavily plated Japanese vessel on the 
way in, Bulkeley asked his crew if they 
wished to attack. To a man— including 
the wounded one—the response was yes. 
PT34 closed to engage. Continuous small 
arms fire had little effect on the enemy 
vessel’s plating until a round struck a fuel 
tank. The resulting explosion caused the 
Japanese vessel’s engines to go quiet, set-
ting it adrift.   
Lieutenant Bulkeley ordered the PT 
boat to lay alongside, threw hand grena-
des inside the Japanese vessel, and leapt 
aboard-- no doubt confident of the men’s 
support behind him. As Breuer relates, 
Bulkeley took three Japanese prisoners 
and collected various documents before 
the craft sunk. This style of close in ma-
ritime fighting was the norm for Bulkeley 
and his men. 
Close-in fighting was also the style of 
William B. Cushing. In April 1863 at age 
21 he was Captain of Commodore Bar-
ney, a 500 ton armed steamer, charged 
with leading a fire support flotilla in sup-
port of Union forces off Suffolk, Virgi-
nia. The day after four Union sailors had 
been taken prisoner and one killed when 
responding to what they believed to be 
a flag of truce from the bank, Cushing 
personally lead a landing party in repri-
sal and to conduct reconnaissance. He 
took a twelve-pound howitzer and ninety 
men ashore and advanced to Chuckatuck, 
Virginia where he believed Confederate 
troops to be stationed. En route he com-
5. Sea Wolf, A Biography of John D. Bulkeley, 
USN , William B. Breuer, Presido Press, 1989
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mandeered a team of mules and a cart 
from a disgruntled farmer. Loading the 
ammunition in the cart and hitching the 
howitzer to the team, Cushing ordered 
the advance on the town. Prior to ente-
ring Chuckatuck, however, he divided his 
force leaving half at a crossroads to set up 
a possible ambush.6 With his remaining 
forty sailors he entered the town’s street 
and met a like number of mounted Con-
federate cavalry preparing to charge his 
shore party. The howitzer was quickly 
readied but in haste its round fired over 
the charging cavalry’s heads. The loud 
report, however, spooked the battle-novi-
ce mules who promptly bolted directly at 
the Confederate force with ammunition 
cart in tow. Seeing his ammunition “jum-
ping ship”, and facing the danger of his 
sailors being cut down by the Confedera-
tes, Cushing capitalized on the confusing 
moment and ordered his men to charge. 
In his own words, “If mules can charge 
cavalry, sailors are braver than mules!”7 
The mounted troops, seeing mules, a cart, 
and forty sailors on foot charging them 
broke and fled, leaving their dead, several 
horses, and the town of Chuckatuck un-
der the U.S. Navy’s command.8  
Bold, aggressive, and audacious, these 
three examples can be complimented by 
6. Lincoln’s Commando, The Biography of 
Commander W.B. Cushing, U.S.N., Roske and 
Van Doren, Harper Brothers, New York, 1957
7. William B. Cushing’s personal diary of the 
event.
8. An interesting follow up to this event is 
told by Roske and Van Doren in Lincoln’s Com-
mand. Cushing abandoned Chuckatuck fearing 
an overwhelming counter attack. Several hours 
later, Confederate General Pickett rode into 
town alone to pay a call on Lasalle Corbell, his 
“charming Sally”. Had Cushing remained, or ar-
rived later, General Pickett may not have been 
available to participate in the Gettysburg battle. 
many historical illustrations in which 
young naval officers thought and fought 
with tactical acumen. Cochrane’s later 
Battle of Aix Roads, Bulkeley’s night 
reconnaissance of Normandy’s beaches, 
and Cushing’s more famous boat attack 
against the Confederate armored ship Al-
bermarle are three more triumphs from 
these littoral lions. There are common 
threads in these actions that illuminate 
leadership lessons for our modern litto-
ral and riverine forces. And, as the Uni-
ted States builds forces designed to once 
again fight in this environment, it needs 
to prepare naval officers to assume grea-
ter tactical responsibility sooner than our 
capital ship-intensive force has traditio-
nally allowed.
In the navies of allies and friends we 
find a rich heritage of courage, daring and 
fearlessness in the littorals. We can learn 
many lessons from their “littoral lions” 
of naval warfare who have demonstrated 
strong leadership, innovation, fortitude 
and endurance—qualities that were as 
important then as they are today.
Some of these examples are part of na-
val history dating many centuries back 
when technology enabled bold action. 
For example, the Romans were better 
soldiers than sailors. To overcome their 
weakness and exploit their strength, they 
developed the corvus, a device to hold 
their ships fast to an opponent’s and al-
low their soldiers to cross over to the 
enemy vessels where they could defeat 
their enemy. 
Likewise, the Baltic Sea in northern 
Europe is a place where many historic 
naval battles have been fought throug-
hout the centuries between nations such 
as Sweden (including Finland), Denmark 
and Russia. The vast archipelagoes on the 
Swedish and Finnish side of the Baltic 
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have for ages constituted good protec-
tion for the Swedish naval forces while 
challenging adversaries. Near Stockholm 
alone one can count over 30,000 islands.  
For centuries, the Swedish Navy and 
its lions have taken advantage of this “ex-
treme littoral” environment.  During the 
Great Northern War (1700–1721), Swe-
den and Russia engaged in many naval 
battles conducted predominately in the 
archipelagoes of Åland and Åboland and 
in the Gulf of Finland. One particular en-
gagement highlights knowledge and un-
derstanding of the environment, as well 
as real skill and daring tested in battle 
between a Swedish flotilla and much big-
ger Russian fleet. 
During the 1714 battle of Hangö Udd, 
a 34-year old Shoutbynacht (rear admi-
ral) Nils Ehrensköld, had taken a position 
at the Bengtsårfjärden (narrow coastal 
inlet) with a small detachment of seven 
canon barges) inside the Hangö archipe-
lago, with very narrow waters and few 
escape routes. The Russian admiral, Fjo-
dor Apraksin, with his fleet of 35 galleys, 
encouraged Ehrenskörd to surrender, but 
Ehrensköld refused and was consequent-
ly attacked by the Russians. Ehrensköld s´ 
small flotilla managed however to force 
the Russians to retreat promptly after the 
second salvo. The Russians then detached 
80 fresh galleys with fully rested crews 
to fight the small Swedish flotilla. There 
were larger Swedish ships of the line in 
the vicinity of Ehrensköld s´ flotilla, but 
they were unable to intervene due to their 
deeper draft.  
It was gallant but bloody battle. 
Ehrenskold’s small force was overwhel-
med by the numerically superior Russi-
ans. Out of the force of 20,000 Russians, 
3,000 were killed with many more woun-
ded. 300 Swedes out of 900 were killed 
and the rest were captured. But it was 
not a true victory for the Russian side—
only 25 galleys were still operative after 
the fight and 115 were put out of action. 
Apraksin s´ superior force was effectively 
repelled. For the Swedish Navy, it was a 
successful defense against a numerically 
superior force, and the Swedish bravery 
at Hangö Udd stopped the Russian s´ ad-
vancement to the Swedish coastline. Eh-
rensköld was wounded and captured but 
found great respect and goodwill from 
Tsar Peter the Great. Ehrensköld was 
promoted to Vice Admiral 1716 and was 
released 1721. Ehrensköld is regarded as 
one of the great sea heroes in the Swedish 
navy – a lion of the Swedish littoral - and 
a destroyer was named after him in 1926. 
The Russian navy commemorated their 
victory by naming a ship “Gangut” (the 
Russian word for Hangö).
In Ehrensköld’s example, boldness, ag-
gressiveness and audacity were required. 
But knowledge of his operating environ-
ment was also a key factor.  Today, mo-
dern naval warfare requires mastery of 
technological to augment audacity.  Bold-
ness and aggressiveness are critical to 
victory, but knowledge and the proper use 
of technology will deliver the win. The 
choices made in the development of naval 
warfighting techniques must be ancho-
red in the physical environment in which 
the technology will be employed while 
serving the concepts of operations and 
addressing the threats. Nowhere do these 
elements converge more acutely than in 
the near shore. Ehrensköld’s force fought 
a surface battle, but today’s engagement 
involves air, undersea, ground, space and 
cyber as well, and the technology has to 
be adapted with a keen sense for the spe-
cific—and often rapidly shifting—ano-
malies present in specific littoral regions. 
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During the Cold War, the Swedish 
Navy learned that many afloat sensors 
and weapon systems were solely desig-
ned for blue water operations and not for 
the littoral or near shore operations of 
existential interest for the Swedish Navy. 
In October, 1981, the Soviet “Whiskey 
class” submarine, commonly but erro-
neously known as “U 137”, ran aground 
inside the Karlskrona archipelago, a short 
distance from Karlskrona naval base. The 
incident is remembered as the “Whiskey 
on the Rocks.”  It was a wakeup call.  Af-
ter that incident, Sweden became aware 
of numerous submarine intrusions in its 
territorial waters over more than a de-
cade. A program was instituted to de-
velop the technology needed to improve 
Hangö Udd and the battle depicted above.
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Sweden’s anti-submarine warfare capa-
bility. A joint ASW task force was es-
tablished and the Navy conducted local 
ASW war fighting to protect the Swedish 
sea border and prevent unwanted incur-
sion into its territorial waters. It became 
obvious that the specific environmental 
conditions that exist in the littorals put 
severe restrictions and limitations on the 
use of many sensor and weapon systems. 
Existing systems had not been designed 
to handle the clutter, shallow waters and 
ducting phenomena that are peculiar to 
that particular environment. To overcome 
these problems, a national research pro-
gram was started and Sweden developed 
its own technology as well as harnessing 
foreign technology bringing about a vast-
ly improved proficiency if not expertise 
in littoral ASW operations. 
Evidence of Sweden evolving as a 
leader in littoral ASW came when the 
U.S. Navy sought to integrate a Swedish 
Gotland class submarine directly into 
its fleet operational experimentation and 
training by bringing it from the Baltic to 
San Diego from 2005 to 2007.  
The common leadership threads abo-
ve are youth combined with boldness, a 
keen sense of risk assessment grounded 
in technical and tactical knowledge, and 
enthusiastic leadership.  
All are three of one piece, but must 
be addressed separately. Let’s deal with 
youth first.
Historically, most riverine and littoral 
warfare tends to be tactical in nature re-
lying on smaller platforms and hence ju-
nior commanders. Most junior maritime 
commanders are neither risk-averse nor 
timid. Compared with traditional career 
paths on larger ships accepting “early” 
command carries early career risk com-
pared to a more traditional path on lar-
ger ships. By contrast, most senior com-
manders become more risk conservative 
as their scope of experience, knowledge 
and responsibility increase. Clausewitz 
recognized this phenomenon in the Army 
“The power of the various emotions is 
sharply reduced by the intervention of 
lucid thought, and, more, by self control. 
Consequently, boldness grows less com-
mon in the higher ranks. Even if growth 
of an officer’s perception and intelligence 
does not keep pace with his rise in rank, 
the realities of war will impose their con-
ditions and concerns.”9   
This is a healthy framework for a Navy 
concerned both with obtaining near-
shore access and maintaining blue-water 
sea line communications. Littoral and in-
shore warfare tends to be tactical in na-
ture, employing smaller platforms where 
a high risk tolerance is necessary for 
success. Control of blue-water commu-
nications tends to be strategic in nature 
relying on capital ships where risk must 
be mitigated to prevent losing critical lo-
gistics through the loss of a fleet. In other 
words, an audacious lieutenant risks his 
ship and maybe a particular battle. An 
9. On War, p 191
Soviet Union Navy submarine “U137” 
aground  in the Swedish Archipelago 
1981, (“Whiskey on the rocks”).
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overly audacious fleet commander risks 
the fleet and the security of strategic com-
munications for a nation. It is good that 
fleet commanders temper their boldness. 
The lesson for littoral forces is simple: as-
sign younger officers to command littoral 
and inshore forces.  Prepare them with an 
appreciation historical littoral operations 
and a professional knowledge of the lit-
toral environment in order to best apply 
their men and systems.
Risk-aggressive youth, however, must 
be tempered with the second leadership 
element: keen technical and tactical 
knowledge. The difference between a 
reckless action and a high risk venture 
is usually a sound plan.  Cochrane’s en-
gagement of Gamo was founded upon 
superb knowledge of Speedy’s sailing 
characteristics, his crew’s capabilities, 
the environment, and Gamo’s limitations. 
Ehrensköld knew his environment and le-
veraged that knowledge to force the Rus-
sians into a Pyrrhic victory. One could 
argue Bulkeley’s and Cushing’s actions 
above were too bold based solely on the 
situations. But having trained the men 
they commanded, both men knew with 
confidence how they could be expec-
ted to perform in a crisis situation. This 
knowledge was born from both officers’ 
personal familiarity with each member of 
their crew and is endemic to life aboard 
small combatant vessels. Roske and Van 
Doren summarized this best by quoting 
the Union’s Secretary of the Navy Gideon 
Wells who wrote of Cushing:
“Many who knew him not personally, 
and some who did, fail to appreciate 
his extraordinary traits of character, 
and impute his acts of heroic daring to 
wild and inconsiderate recklessness, 
but there was in his dashing exploits, 
not only audacity and intrepid cou-
rage, but wonderful sagacity and pru-
dence. Projects which most persons 
deemed wild and inconsiderate will 
be found on investigation to have been 
deliberate and well planned designs, 
and the results, whether in overcoming 
or putting to flight superior numbers, 
naval and military, in lower Virginia, 
hazardous enterprises in the sounds 
and rivers of North Carolina, or in the 
destruction of the ironclad steamer 
Albermarle, demonstrate the wisdom 
and intelligence which prompted, no 
less than the courage of the young of-
ficer in every instance”10
“Deliberate well planned designs” of 
high risk ventures is a page directly from 
the special warfare culture. Highly trai-
ned in their equipment and operating en-
vironments, SEALS, Rangers, Army and 
Air Force Special Warfare units provide 
a template for preparing junior surface 
officers to assume littoral and riverine 
responsibilities. Of course, Admiral Ar-
leigh Burke’s direction to the crew of 
USS Arleigh Burke—“This ship is built 
to fight. You had better know how”—is 
good advice for sailors everywhere, but 
for the unique near and in shore environ-
ment, sailors must learn both maritime 
and land environment considerations. 
Dedicated time is required to prepare 
Navy officers to operate in this unique 
environment and gain the technical and 
tactical knowledge needed to make quick 
risk assessments in tactical situations. 
Sufficient career time is needed to de-
velop as a warfare expert, to work with 
crews, and to develop leadership skills in 
the near shore environment. The proxi-
mity to land also means much more com-
bat capability can be brought to bear at 
10. Lincoln’s Commando, p 300
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sea, such as shore batteries, shore based 
air, and swarms of fast attack craft.  Capt. 
Wayne Hughes, author of Fleet Tactics 
and Coastal Combat (published by the 
Naval Institute Press), says “Perhaps the 
navies of the world should no longer refer 
to ‘naval’ tactics at all. It is more reaso-
nable to think in terms of ‘littoral tactics 
that include warships.’” Our littoral lions 
operating in the environment must have 
a working knowledge of the land force’s 
influence on near shore operations.
This warrants a distinct career path, 
not just the past’s “one tour in small 
ships” model the U.S. Navy’s surface 
community has tolerated. A typical lit-
toral career progression may be two tours 
in riverine forces followed by two tours 
and command of LCS, with Riverine and 
LCS Squadron command the pinnacle. 
This is also an argument why the Navy 
needs to maintain a small ship and boat 
contingent continuously vice simply buil-
ding them on demand. The core of a tac-
tically proficient manpower force must be 
continuously maintained to meet rapidly 
emerging requirements.
Most important, the littoral lions’ final 
trait is enthusiastic leadership. This is the 
least challenging objective to meet. The 
United States and Swedish surface Navy 
is filled with junior officers thirsting to 
match their capabilities to the challen-
ges of early command and tactical re-
sponsibility. They should be encouraged 
to step into the new littoral and riverine 
navies, assured of career path recogni-
zed and supported by the surface Navy. 
They should also be inspired to dare bril-
liantly. Recognizing intelligent failures 
can foster growth, we cannot but gain 
better leaders for the corporate risks ta-
ken in their development. Intelligent and 
inspired “self-starters” should actively be 
sought among our midshipman, recruited 
to begin filling the entry-level positions 
for our riverine and smaller combatants. 
They will form the core leadership to cre-
ate the Navy’s credible maritime security 
and inshore mission capability. Within 
these ranks, a future audacious Ehren-
sköld, Cochrane, Bulkeley, or Cushing 
will win the littoral and rivers for our 
navies.  
So, it will be with the future “Lions of 
the littorals” as it was with those legends 
from the past.. 
The corvus that allowed the daring 
boarding parties of the past to cross deck 
and fight have given way to the missiles 
and lasers that will allow future, skilled 
littoral warriors to duel and win. This 
will be where the audacious triumph over 
the timid – this will be an endeavor of 
boldness and daring best left to the youth-
ful in spirit.    
Even navies with unique maritime ho-
meland defense environments must also 
be capable in blue water, and able to de-
ploy globally in support of multinational 
coalitions. With all the knowledge we 
have today it must be obvious that all sys-
tems onboard have to be both littoral and 
blue water proficient, especially with the 
awareness that an overwhelmingly part 
of all naval battles in the world have been 
conducted in the littorals or near shore.
Strong requirements have to be put on 
sensor and weapon systems in order to 
handle the very complex operational en-
vironment and short reaction times in the 
littorals. While a system proficient for the 
littorals will normally also be proficient 
for blue water operations, the opposite is 
not always the case.
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